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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES AN ESCROW
AGREEMENT TO BE IN WRITING, AND ABSENT SUCH
A WRITING, THE CLAIMS FOR CONVERSION AND
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CANNOT STAND
Plaintiff contends an escrow agreement related to funds from a security interest in
real property does not need to be in writing because there was not a lease or sale of land
or any interest in land. However, this contention is contrary to the caselaw and the plain
language of the controlling Utah statute.
In Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court
held "under the Utah Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was required to be
in writing. See Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1995)." Further, section 25-5-3 provides,
with emphasis:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, or any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
The assertion that loaning money in return for a security interest (Trust Deed) is not "any
interest in land" is incorrect. What is a security interest in real property if not an interest
in land? The concept of a security interest in real property constituting an interest in land
seems obvious on its face and has been borne out by the courts. In in re Borriello, 329

B.R. 367, 380 (Bkrtcy E.D. N.Y. 2005), the bankruptcy court stated "A 'mortgage1 is an
interest in land created by a written instrument providing security for the performance of
a duty or the payment of a debt.'"
Moreover, in Utah "a trust deed is intended to convey some kind of title to real
property." Capital Assets Fin, Srvs. v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 2000).
Accordingly, it is clear from the above-referenced authority that a trust deed and escrow
proceeds therefrom are subject to the statute of frauds and any contention that funds2
were to be set aside and potentially refunded to the Bennetts upon unstated conditions
may not be entertained as there is no writing to support such allegations.
The cases cited by the Bennetts for the proposition that the proceeds of the
security interest in the land are not subject to the statute of frauds are all distinguishable.
Corbet v. Corbet, All P.2d 430 (Utah 1970) concerned a partnership that held real
property and dealt with a dispute whether partnership land would be conveyed from the
partnership to the ex-wife and the proceeds of.a sale that occurred apparently years. In
"A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in that it is given as security for the performance
of an obligation. However, a trust deed is a conveyance by which title to the trust
property passes to the trustee. Upon default, the trustee has power to sell the property to
satisfy the trustor's debt to the beneficiary." First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780
P.2d 1253,1256 (Utah 1989).
2

The Bennetts asserted in their Complaint and throughout discovery until the pretrial
briefs were submitted, that they were entitled to the return of the entire amount of
$27,955.98 that is shown on Defendant's Ex. 102 (attached as Ex. "A" to Huish's
opening Brief). However, for the first time in their proposed Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 114) they changed their story and argued they were only entitled
to the return of $18,643.98. This illustrates the very reason any agreements to hold funds
to be returned or disbursed on certain conditions must be in writing. The changed story
undermines their theory that Huish told them he would hold the entire $27,955.98 to be
returned or disbursed under certain unstated circumstances.

the case at bar, the funds in dispute were created contemporaneous with the creation of
the security interest in land.
Pagano v. Ippoliti, 716 A.2d 848 (Conn. 1998) is factually distinguishable because
it also concerned a dispute over partnership interests and not a security interest or funds
from real property. The case at bar did deal with money for the transfer (if only to a
trustee) of real property. Pagano is legally distinguishable in that Utah caselaw and
relevant statute cited above control in Utah rather than the laws of Connecticut, and in
Utah, escrow agreements related to real property, as opposed to partnership agreements,
must be in writing to be enforceable.
Bennetts cite to Wright & Souza, Inc. v. DM Properties, 510 N.W.2d 413 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that an agreement to pay a fee does not become
subject to the statute of frauds just because a deed of trust is involved. However, this
case is distinguishable for two reasons. First, in Wright, the dispute was about an oral
promise to obtain refinancing, not as is alleged in the case at bar, an alleged oral
agreement to retain and return funds under certain circumstances and conditions.3
Second, the Nebraska statute of frauds construed in Wright is materially different
than the Utah statute in that it does not include interests in lands. The Nebraska statute of
frauds reads as follows:
Every contract for the sale of lands between the owner thereof and any
broker or agent employed to sell the same, shall be void, unless the contract
is in writing and subscribed by the owner of the land and the broker or
3

It is interesting to note in Wright, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to
instruct the jury regarding breach of fiduciary duty by the broker against an alleged agent
for failing to disclose other negotiations. Wright, 510 N.W.2d at 416.

agent. Such contract shall describe the land to be sold, and set forth the
compensation to be allowed by the owner in case of sale by the broker or
agent.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-107. In contrast, the Utah statute of frauds provides as
follows:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorizing in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (emphasis added).
Thus, because the Utah statute expressly includes "interest in lands" the Wright
case based upon the Nebraska statute is distinguishable and of no persuasive value in the
case at bar.
Next, Bennetts cite to Bridewell v. Pritchett, 562 S.W. 2d 956 (Tex. App. 1978),
for the holding that the statute of limitations is not brought in to play because real estate
is involved. Again, the facts are distinguishable in that in Bridewell, the dispute involved
the issue of a new loan contract where the interest rate had changed that impacted a
pending foreclosure. Id. at 958. That is dissimilar to the loan and security interest
entered into in the case at bar and the alleged agreement to hold and return funds under
certain circumstances.
This Court has clearly stated in Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176, (Utah Ct
App 1995), "under the Utah Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was
required to be in writing. See Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1995)." (emphasis

added).4 Because the allegations by the Bennetts were undeniably concerning an escrow
"to be held . . . until the happening of a contingency or performance of a condition" any
alleged "agreement" would not even be enforceable because it was not in writing.5 The
policy behind the writing requirement is so that Courts do not have to deal with "he said,
she said" allegations long after the fact.
Bennetts next assert even if the statute of frauds applies, it was satisfied by the
closing statement. This is curious. If the Closing Statement attached to Huish's opening
brief satisfied the statute of frauds regarding the escrow, what are the terms of the
escrow? Under what circumstances would the money be returned? How much would be
returned? Would the escrow be deposited in an interest bearing account? What was the
time frame for contingencies to be fulfilled or the money returned? All of these
unanswered questions illustrate the reasons why such agreements have to be in writing to
be enforceable. If the terms are not spelled out, there is nothing to enforce.

Escrow is defined as follows:
A legal document (such as a deed), money, stock, or other property
delivered by the grantor, promisor, or obligor into the hands of a third
person, to be held by the latter until the happening of a contingency or
performance of a condition, and then by him delivered to the grantee,
promisee, or obligee. A system of document transfer in which a deed,
bond, stock, funds or other property is delivered to a third person to hold
until all conditions in a contract are fulfilled; e.g. delivery of a deed to
escrow agent under installment land sale contract until full payment for a
land is made. Black's Law Dictionary p. 545 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis
added).
'Miguel v. Belzeski, 70 F.3d 1274, 1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir 1995) (attached to Huish's
opening brief as Exhibit "C") is consistent with Utah law in holding "the statute of frauds
applies to escrow agreements and not just conveyances of land." Id. at 6.

Bennetts also contend the statute of frauds defense was not timely raised and was
waived. Bennetts cite to ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 252
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) for the proposition that an affirmative defense such as the statute of
frauds can be waived if not timely raised. While the Answer did not specifically use the
words "statute of frauds/5 it did assert "The Complaint is barred in whole or in part, by
the doctrines of consent, waiver, estoppel, acquiescence, ratification, release, unclean
hands, and latches, as well by the terms of the applicable written agreements." (R. 18).
(Emphasis added). The Answer also reserved "the right to raise additional affirmative
defenses as discovery progresses in this case." (R. 18).
Nevertheless, even if the above references are insufficient, the statute of frauds
defense still should have been considered by the trial court. The statute of frauds defense
was raised at trial without any objection. Appellants' Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law stated
The Utah Statute of Frauds requires escrow agreements to be in writing.
See Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3; see also, Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d
1172, 1176 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) (holding "[u]nder the Utah Statute of
Frauds, the original escrow agreement was required to be in writing. See
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1995)/')
(R. 101). The trial court admitted to reading the proposed findings before trial
began:
•

"THE COURT: All right, I've received your proposed findings and
such and have been through those." (Tr. 1).

•

"[B]ut again I've read your proposed findings and I'll be glad to hear
an opening statement if either of you like to do that." (Tr. 3).

•

"THE COURT: All right, and I understand that and again from your
proposed findings . . . " (Tr. 45).

Additionally, the statute of frauds was argued in closing argument:
If this were to be an escrow agreement, the statute of frauds requires that to
be in writing. That's one of the things that in our state we decided that has
to - if you're going to do that, that needs to be in writing. There is no
writing for an escrow agreement. (Tr. 204) (emphasis added).
At no time during trial did counsel for Bennetts object to statute of frauds defense.
Accordingly, because the issue of the statute of frauds was addressed and argued before
the trial court without objection from counsel for the Bennetts, it was tried by the express
or implied consent of the parties as if it had been explicitly raised in the pleadings. In
Ford v. Tandy Tramp., Inc., 620 N.E.2d 996, 1007 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) a similar case
was considered by the Ohio Court of Appeals held as follows:
We initially note that the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense which
is generally waived if not raised in the pleadings. (Citation omitted). In this
case, [defendant] failed to raise this affirmative defense in its answer. In
fact, [defendant] never filed any answer to [plaintiffs] complaint.
However, [plaintiff] never raised these procedural issues during the
proceedings and the trial court proceeded to hear arguments on the Statute
of Frauds on the merits. Therefore, it is apparent that this issue was tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, and the issue must be treated
as if it had been raised in the pleadings. (Citation omitted). Civ. R. 15(B);
10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (1983) 43, §
2721.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also expressly provides that evidence
and arguments made to the trial court without objection should be considered by the trial
court:
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such

amendments to the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues.
Accordingly, the statute of frauds was timely raised, presented and argued to the trial
court, and it should have been considered by the trial court.
POINT II
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS IMPROPERLY ALLOWED
Over objection (Tr. 45), the trial court allowed Tim Bennett to testify about
alleged oral statements made by Huish about returning the entire $27,955.986 in dispute
to the Bennetts when the Closing Statement plainly disclosed why that amount was
disbursed:

6

It should be noted Tim Bennett testified consistent with the Complaint that Huish told
him he would hold on to the entire $27,955 under an alleged escrow arrangement, and yet
changed his tune at trial and admitted at least $9,314 was properly paid to UTCO.
Q. And is it your testimony here today under oath that this $27,955.98 Mr.
Huish told you that that amount, that $27,955 would be set aside and held
for future extension fees?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And you're certain of that?
A. I'm absolutely deadly certain of that, yes.
Q. However, you now acknowledge that part of that $27,955 that $9,314
was in fact properly paid to UTCO, correct?
A. Yes. (Tr. 84).
Again, admission exposes the fatal flaw in the Bennetts' story. All the way until trial,
they alleged Huish promised them the entire $27,955 would be held for them and
supposedly returned to them under some unstated contingency, however, in spite of Tim
Bennett's vehement "deadly certain" statement that Huish promised the entire amount,
Mr. Bennett abandoned that story at trial and admitted some of it properly went to
UTCO. It cannot be both ways. Tim Bennett's changed story eviscerates his allegations
of an oral escrow agreement.

Disbursements for Borrower
To: Utah Funding and Loan $27,955.98
For: 30 day Loan extension Beck
Street (Ex. 102)
Parol evidence to alter or contradict a writing is not admitted unless the writing is
ambiguous as a matter of law. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994). There
is no ambiguity about what the $27,955.98 was to be disbursed for as the Closing
Statement clearly stated it was for an extension on the Beck Street property loan that had
fallen in arrears. It was improper to permit testimony that $27,955.98 was to be held in
escrow for extension fees or returned to Plaintiffs under any circumstance or condition.
The four comers of the document are clear. The fact that there is no integration
clause in the Closing Agreement does not mean there is an open door for testimony about
alleged oral statements about the holding of funds. See Henry v. First Federal Savings
& Loan Assoc,, 459 A.2d 772, 776 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming summary judgment and
barring evidence of alleged prior oral representations pursuant the parol evidence rule
upon finding that, even in the absence of integration clause, written loan agreement was
complete as to subject matter).
Accordingly, there should have been no testimony allowed about any alleged
escrow agreement and the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion must fail as
a matter of law.

POINT III
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
The elements to prove breach of fiduciary duty were not established at trial. The
legal standard requires:
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a party must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) That the parties were
engaged in a joint venture; (2) That one party took actions which
benefited himself at the expense of the joint venture and which were
inconsistent with the understanding of the parties or otherwise acted
in a way inconsistent with the duties of loyalty, good faith, fairness
and honesty owed by parties engaged in a joint venture to one
another; and (3) That as a result, the other party suffered damages."
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Huish took no action inconsistent with any joint venture loyalty, good faith,
fairness or honesty owed to parties in a joint venture. Huish was involved to provide a
service and to be compensated for his services. Huish was entitled to extension fees for
negotiating loan extensions and forbearance with the lender.
Huish violated no statute, rule or regulation regarding disclosure of escrow fees on
a commercial loan. There is no requirement for a more detailed itemization of extension
fees to be paid on a commercial loan. Federal regulation Z does not apply to commercial
loans. (R. 173).
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO CONVERSION
There was no conversion. Huish did not receive any commissions and fees that he
was not entitled to take and he received no commissions and fees he did not negotiate and
disclose to the Bennetts in writing—signed by the Bennetts. "'A conversion is an act of

willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person
entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession . . . . Specifically, a party alleging
conversion must show that he or she is entitled to immediate possession of the property at
the time of the alleged conversion'" Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp, 78 P.3d 988, 992
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). What did Huish take
that the Bennetts were entitled to immediate possession of? Funds were disbursed as
agreed in writing for their stated purpose. Huish did not abscond with any funds.
Although a "hard money loan" is somewhat distasteful to most people, it is not illegal in
Utah and just because a loan carries high interest and high extension fees and
commissions does not equate to conversion or breach of fiduciary duty when a borrower
gets buyers remorse. The Bennetts were grateful to Huish and their arms were wide open
to receive $1,200,000 in financing that nobody else could procure in order to purchase a
distressed property that offered hundreds of thousands of dollars in instant equity (Tr. 63647). However, the Bennetts are adults and they are responsible for their business
judgment—not the Huish and Utah Funding. If the Bennetts' business ventures were
disappointing, they cannot now transfer blame to Appellants in an attempt to unwind
what may appear in hindsight to have been poor decisions.
7

Q. The reason you wanted to pick up the property before the tax sale was you thought it
was a good investment, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that you perhaps would be purchasing a property that would have instant equity
in it, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And in fact, it would have several hundred - possibly several hundred thousand
dollars in equity?
A. Yes. (Tr. 63-64).

The fees amounting to $27,955.98 were identified and disclosed as extension fees
for Beck Street property and not to be held in escrow subject to unwritten contingencies.
There simply cannot be conversion for commission that were negotiated, disclosed and
agreed to in writing.
POINT V
PUNITIVE DAMGES WERE UNWARRANTED, EXCESSIVE
AND IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS
Although Defendants were not found guilty of fraud by the trial court, the trial
court still awarded punitive damages of $50,000 in an attempt to get Defendant's to
disgorge commissions earned from Bennetts in the two loans discussed herein. The
punitive damage award was without proper support as there was not any evidence of
Defendants' assets or ability to pay. Even if Defendants' had been found to have acted
fraudulently, fraud alone does not necessarily meet the threshold to sustain punitive
damages. Guaranty National, 769 P.2d 269, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Defendants believe the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action
were unsupported, as Huish did not abscond or steal any funds, and therefore, there is no
basis to support compensatory damages, let alone punitive damages. Nonetheless, if the
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty were valid, at a minimum, the case should be
remanded to take evidence as to the Defendants' financial situation or ability to pay
punitive damages. In Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court held that a punitive damage award of $25,000 could not be sustained "because it
was entered without adducing any evidence or making any findings of fact regarding

Defendants' net worth or income." Id at 1219; see also Bundy v. Century Equipment
Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) (holding "in the absence of such evidence [as to
Defendants' net worth] the award of [punitive damages] can not be sustained."). Under
these circumstances the punitive damage award is unwarranted and excessive. See
Campbell v. State Farm, 98 P. 3d 409 (Utah 2004).
POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Prejudgment interest is only appropriate when damages can be calculated with
mathematical certainty. Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(holding prejudgment interest is not allowed "where damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical certainty"). Because the damages amount changed as the
case evolved at trial, beginning with the Bennetts' claim of $27,955.98 and going down
from there, the damages were not certain enough to support prejudgment interest. See
James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing "when damages are uncertain or speculative until fixed by the factfinder,
Utah courts have refused to award prejudgment interest").
POINT VII
HUISH IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS
IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
Huish acted at all times in the course and scope of his employment with Utah
Funding & Loan, Inc. Huish is entitled to the corporate shield defense. Even if he
committed intentional torts, he is protected. See Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 667

(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting Plaintiffs argument "that the corporate shield defense
does not apply to an intentional tort, including conversion . . . [holding] there is clear
Utah authority to the contrary: "'An employer is liable for the torts of its employees that
are committed within the scope of employment, even if the tortuous acts were
intentional.'").
The case of Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003) cited by
Bennetts is distinguishable in that it involved fraud against the corporation and its
principal. Fraud was not found in the case at bar, and a careful application of the law to
the facts would not even sustain conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Even if a
judgment is warranted, it should only be against Utah Funding & Loan, Inc. and not
against Huish personally.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis to hold Defendants liable in conversion and breach of fiduciary
duty for the judgment imposed by the trial court as the alleged escrow agreement
described by Plaintiffs and the trial court was nowhere in writing, and as such, could not
be enforced. Furthermore, the logic of Plaintiffs' argument for this money fails as their
testimony at trial is inconsistent with their complaint in theory. Finally, the trial court
should not have considered and adopted parol evidence regarding the Closing Statement,
and the elements for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty were not proven and there is
no basis to sustain punitive damages. Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request an
order from this Court reversing the decision of the trial court in its entirety.
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